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IN THF. STlPREM.E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATR OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Appellant,

••

-v-

••

RORERT HICT<EN,

Case no.

183~1

••

Defennant-Respondent.

APP~f,L.A.NT'

••

S BRIEF IN STJPPO:R.T OF

PRTITI0N FOR REHEARINr,

INT:RODUCTORY NOTB

The standard established by this Court for
determining whether a petition for rehearinq is proper was
expressea in Brown v. Pritchard, 4 Utah 2q2, 9 P. 573: reh.
den. , 4 Utah

'-q 2,

2<l 4, 11 P. 512 ( 18 R ~) :

• • • [To] justify a rehearing, a strong
case must be mane. We must be convinced
that the court failed to consiner some
material point in the case, or that it
erred in its conclusions, or that some
matter has been discovered which was
unknown at the time of the hearing.
In Cummings v.

~eilsen,

42 ntah

l~;,

l

2Cl P.

619, 624 ( 1913),

the Court stated:
make an application for a rehearing is
a matter of right, and we have no desire
to discourage the practice of filing
petitions for rehearings in proper cases.
• • • [Al rehearing shoula not be applied
for, unless we have rnisconstrueo or overlooken some material fact or facts, or
TO
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have overlooked some statute or decision
which may affect the result, or that we
have based the decision on some wrong
principle of law, or have either
misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result. • • • If
there are some reasons, however, such as
we have indicated ahove, or other qoon
reasons, a petition for a rehear1nq shouln
be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court ( ~nhasis
added).
The argument portion of this brief will show that
this petition for rehearing is properly before this Court in
that this Court in its decision issued February 4, 1983,
overlooked certain elementary rules of Bnglish usage and
principles of logic which materially affect this appeal and
misconstrued~

5A-37-8(l)(a)(iv) in rendering its opinion.
STATF!MENT

OF

THE NATUP.E

OF

THE

CASE

Respondent was charged with distribution of a
controlled substance for value: to wit, marijuana, in
violation of Utah Code Ann.,

E;

SR-17-R(l)(a)(ii)

(1()~1),

as

amended.
nISPOSITION IN

THE LOWBR COtlRT

Respondent was tried before a jury on February 17,
1982 in the Fourth Junicial District Court for Utah County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson presiding.
trial court issued a final order granting nefendantrespondent's Motion to DisMiss the Information.
-2-
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The

RELIEF SOU'1HT ON .APPEAL
Appellant seeks the granting of a rehearing or a
summary reversal of this Court's February 14, 1983 necision in
this case.
STA""F,MF.l'~T

l~,

On October

OF 'r'HF. FAC'rS

1Q81, respondent Robert Hicken was at

the home of Jerry Middle ton in Provo, ntah, hoping to meet a
new customer to whom he couln sell nrugs (T. 13).

Mr.

Middleton was working in cooperation with Sergeant Paul
Markling of the Provo City Police Department (T. 13, 28,

~2).

At some point in the day, Juny Smith, a Provo City Police
DepartMent employee working for the netective's division, went
to Mr. Midaleton's home and was met at the noor by Mr.
Mindleton (T. 13).

Miss Smith was acting under the

instructions of Sergeant Markling ann was to attempt to buy
some marijuana or cocaine from a third party (T. 11, 2R}.
Miss Smith din not know Mr. Mindleton, nor was she aware he
was actinq in cooperation with the police (T. 240.

Mr.

Middleton intronuced Miss Smith to respondent (T. 14l.
Respondent asked Miss Smith how much she wanted to purchase,
and after confirming the price and quantity with his "source"
over the telephone, respondent aqreed to sell her two bags of
marijuana for

$~5

(T.

13-1~).

Respondent instructed Miss SMith, Mr. Middleton and
Mr. Middleton's little sister to get into Miss Smith's car and
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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follow respondent in his car (T. 16).

At approximately llOn

South and 50 Bast in Orem, responnent pullen over to the side
of the roan and asken Miss Smith to qo with him to complete
the previously negotiated sale while 1Ar. Middleton and his
l~).

little sister waited in Miss Smith's car (T.

Respondent

drove Miss Br.tith in his car to the home of his "source," Mr.
Larsen (T. 17).
Once inside, responnent
Miss
17).

~mith,

explaine~

to Mr. Larsen that

not respondent, was to purchase the marijuana (T.

Mr. Larsen, followed by respondent, went into a hack

room for a few minutes (T. 17).

When they returned,

respondent was carrying the marijuana.

He examinen it,

comrnentea that it was "really good stuff" and delivered it to
Miss Smith (T. lR-l'l, 26).
~95,

Miss Smith then paid Mr. Larsen

the previously agreed upon price

(~.

lQ).

Respondent drove Miss Smith back to her car (T. 2n).
She drove Mr. Mindleton ann his little sister back to their
home, and then nrove to the police station where she reported
to

Ser~eant

Markling and gave him the marijuana (T. 20).

At trial, after the State rested its case,
defendant-respondent Moveo to dismiss the Information claiming
~tate,

that in liqht of the evidence produced by the
respondent had been improperly charged unoer

~

5R-~7-R(l)(a)

(ii), the distribution for value subsection, and should have
been chargen under~ 58-~7-R(l)(al(iv) which nef.ense counsel
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characterized as the "arranginq statute" (T. 33-36).

The

State reasoned that because Utah's aiding and abetting
statute,

~

'76-?.-2-2, provioes that an aider and abettor mav be

charged as a principal, respondent was, in fact, correctly
chargea because the eviaence clearly showed that he had aiaea
in the distribution of a controllen substance for value (T.
33-37).

Despite the State's argument, the court rulen that
~

the aiding and abetting provision,

76-2-202 of the Criminal

Code, did not apply to the Controlled Substances Act and
therefore respondent could not be found guilty of the crime
charged in the Information (T. 37).
Appellant appealed the final jurlqment of dismissal
pursuant to Rule

2~(c)(l)

of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure.
AP.~TJMP.NT

The Court's opinion holds that respondent shouln
have been charged with "arranginq a sale" under Utah r.oae
Ann.,
Cone

E;

SR-3'-R(l)(al(ivl

Ann.,~

(1~~3),

as amended, and that Utah

76-2-202 (lq53), as amended, din not apply.

'!he

opinion is supported by the reasoning that the Controlled
Substances Act expressly and specifically sanctions the
offense of arranqinq for the distribution of a controlled
substance and thereby displaces the general sanction for
aioing and abetting providen for in ~ 76-2-202.

In reaching
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this conclusion, the Court has overlooked certain ele~entary
principles of ~nglish usage and principles of logic which
materially affect this appeal and has failed to discern the
plain meaning of the statute.
Utah Code

Ann.,~

~R-37-A(l)(a)(iv)

(1953), as

amended, must be read in its entirety for its meaning to
become manifest.

It states:

(a) Except as authorizen hy this act, it
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
ann intentionally: • • •
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute or dispense a controlled
substance for value or to negotiate to
have a controlled substance distributed or
dispensen for value ana distribute,
nispense, or negotiate the distrihution or
dispensing of any other liquid, substance,
or material in lieu of the specific
controlled suhstance so offered, agreed,
consented, arranged, or negotiated
(Emphasis added).
For purposes of illustrative argument, subpart (iv) may he
divided into three phrases, A, Rand C.

Phrase A includes:

To agree, consent, offer, or to arrange to
distribute or disperse a controlled
substance for value
Phrase A is connectert, without punctuation, by the word "or"
to Phrase B which reads:
to neqotiate to have a controlled
substance distributed or dispensen for
value
Phrase B is connected, without punctuation, by the word "and"
-6-
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to the final phrase of the statute, Phrase

c,

which reaas:

distribute, dispense, or neqotiate the
distribution or dispensing of any other
liquid, substance, or material in lieu of
the specific controlled substance so
offered, agreed, consenten, arranged, or
negotiated.
nemarcated as explained above, subpart (iv) appears as
follows:
TO agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute or dispense a controlled
substance for value I
or I
to
negotiate to have a controllea substance
distributed or dispense for value / and I
distribute, dispense, or negotiate the-distribution or nispensing of any other
liquid, substance, or material in lieu of
the specific controlled substance so
offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or
negotiated (Fnphasis adoed).
When the subpart is read as it is interpreted in the
Court's opinion, the "or" which appears between :Phrase A and
Phrase B is emphasized.

So rean, the subpart proscribes the

conduct "A" and also proscribes the conduct "B and

c."

The "or" emphasized by the Court, however, is not
the only connective used in the statute.

One

There are many.

of equal importance is the first "or" found in Phrase

c.

One

of greater importance is the "and" which appears between
Phrases B and c.

When the subpart is read as interpreted by

appellant, this "and" in con:iunction with Phrase C properly
becomes the crux of the subpart.
-7-
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Appellant's interpretation of the subpart is that it
proscribes the condct "A and C" ana also proscribes the
conduct "B and

c."

logically read.
by this subpart.

This is what the subpart savs when

The conrluct "A" by itself is not proscribed
That is, an agreement, offer, arrangement or

consent to the distribution or dispensing of a controlled
substance is not punishable by this subpart if standing alone,
contrary to this Court's opinion.
The reasons supporting appellant's interpretation
are several and are based primarily upon rules of

~nglish

usage and logic as these disciplines are related to the
construction of the subsection.

The first reason is that

there is no punctuation between Phrase "A" and the "or"
introducing Phrase "R."

If there was a comma before the word

"or", the Court's holding that Phrase "A" is a separate
criminal sanction independent of Phrases
correct.

"~"

and "C" might be

'!'his would he consistent with the rule of Bnglish

usage that requires that a

co~ma

be placed before a

conjunction introducinq an indepennent clause.

The absence of

a comma before "or" indicates that Phrase A must be read in
conjunction with Phrase C and is not a separate criminal
sanction in and of itself.
The second reason is that Phrase A is stated in the
conjunctive in relation to Phrase C.

Although the "or"

irrlicates that Phrases A and B are stated in the disjunctive,
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they are disjunctive only so far as they relate to each other.
Phrase A is nonetheless stated in the conjunctive in relation
to Phrase C, and similarly, Phrase R is stated in the
conjunctive in relation to Phrase

c.

This is more easilv

understood if it is rememberen that al 1 three phrases fol low
from subsection (a) of the statute ana are all dependent
c la use-s.

Absent punctuation indicating otherwise, the use of

the word "or" does not divorce Phrase

A

from the remainder of

the sentence.
The third and perhaps the most compelling reason
sustaining appellant's interpretation of the subpart involves
the parallel structure of the statute.

Phrase C incorporates

all the essential language of both Phrase A and Phrase B (with
the exception of the "for value" requirement) ana also the
"or" connecting those phrases.

The "distribute or dispense"

language of Phrase A is paired, again hy a disjunctive "or",
with the "to neqot iate to have • • • distributed or dispersed"
language of Phrase B.

This language, identical in meaning,

appears in Phrase C as "nistribute, dispense, or negotiate
distribution or dispensing."
After the above reiteration, Phrase C adds its own
operative language, that being:
or material in lieu of."

"anv other liquid, substance,

This is followed by the words "the

specific controlled substance."

This language of Phrase C

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

refers the reader directly hack to its parallel, the "a
controllea substance" lanquage found in both Phrase A and
Phrase R.

Such syntax is not mere coincidence.
That Phrase A of the subpart cannot be read alone is

also clear from the Legislature's inclusion of the language
"so offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated" in
Phrase

c.

"Negotiated," as the Court imolied in its opinion

in this case, clearly corresponds with "negotiate" as useo in
Phrase B.

The words "so offered, agreed, consented, arranged"

in Phrase C clearly correspond with the "agree, consent,
offer, or arrange" languaqe of Phrase A and are conclusive
evidence that Phrase

A

and Phrase C are to be read together.

This is the only reason languaqe from Phrase
repeated in parallel form in Phrase

c.

A

wouln be

If the subpart were to

be interpreted as the Court has in this case, this expression
of coordinate ideas in similar form would be unneeded,
irrelevant and confusing.

Thus, it is apparent that Phrase C

was meant to be read in conjunction with either Phrase A or
Phrase B as the circumstances of the particular case miqht
require.
Drafting the suhpart in this way, so that it solelv
applies where any other liquid, suhstance, or material in lieu
of a specific controllea substance is involved, cannot be saia
to be myopic on the part of the Legislature.

The subpart

addresses one problem, that known in the vernacular as a
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"turkey buy."

It addresses the problem in terms of a person

performing the distribution or dispensing necessary for the
"turkey buy" himself, and in terms of the person negotiating
to have another perform the actual distribution or aispensing.
The subpart makes reference to both controllen and counterfeit
substances only because providing a counterfeit substance in
lieu of a controlled substance is the essence of a "turkev
buy."

"Arranging" for the distribution of a qenuine

controlled substance, as occurren in the facts of this case,
is clearly proscribea by subpart (ii) of
Controlled Substances Act ann

§

7~-?-~n2

~

5R-37-8 of the

of the Criminal Code.

Section 76-2-202 is applicable to the Controlled Substances
Act by way of Utah Code

Ann.,~

76-1-103 (1953), as amended.

State v. ,Jeppson, Utah, 5411 P./.d 894 (1976).

Subpart (iv)

applies only to "in lieu of" distributions and dispensings and
is therefore not in conflict with a finding of criminal
culpability under the agency theory.
'T"he Court's reliance on State v. Harrison, ntah, flnl
P.2d 922 (1979), in conjunction with its distinction of State
v. Jeppson, ntah, 546 P.?.d R94 (1C)7f'), is enlightening.

In

Harrison, at 293, this Court made the followinq statement in
reference to subpart (iv) at issue here:
A statute may le~itimately proscribe a
broaa spectrum of cona.uct with a very few
words, so long as the outer perimeters of
such conauct are clearly nefined.
The
-11-
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statute in question accomplishes this by
specifying that any activity leading to or
resultinq in the distribution for value of
a controlled substance must be engaged in
knowingly or with intent that such
distribution would, or would he likely to
occur. Thus, any wittinq or intentional
lending of aid in the distribution of
druqs, whatever form it takes, is
proscribed by the act (Bmphasis added).
In the earlier case, Jeppson, the defendant was charged with
aiding another because he hao knowingly and intentionally made
his trailer available to persons unlawfully possessinq, using
or distrihuting controlled substances therein.

Id. at 895.

The Court upheln the use of an aiding ana abetting instruction
incorporatinq, in haec verba, the provisions of

~

~~-2-20?

the basis that:
It is applicable here, because the
Controlled ~ubstances Act noes not
specifically provide otherwise, nor does
its context require otherwise.
Id. at 896.

In its opinion in this case the Court further

elaborated:
There are no provisions in the ntah
Controllen Substances Act dealing with the
offense of providing a place for illegally
selling drugs, and therefore the
provisions of the Criminal Code may be
resorterl to.
State v. Ricken, Utah,
19R3, at 3

(1~~3).

P.2d

--,

filen Fehruarv 14,

This distinction appears to be at odds
-12-
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on

with the Court's declaration in Harrison.

Unless one is to

believe that providing a place for illegally selling drugs is
not inclunea in "any witting or intentional lending of aid in
the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes," Harrison
arrl Jeppson are in conflict.

That conflict, instead of being

resolved by the Court's opinion in this case, is perpetuated
.,

by it.

Appellant submits that this conflict uouln be
ef feet ively resolved if it were to apply the Jeppson precedent
to the facts of this case and hold that respondent was
properly charged with Distribution of a Controlled Substance
for value in violation of Utah Cone

Ann.,~

58-37-B(l)(a)(ii)

ana that subpart (iv) of. the statute applies only to sales
involvinq suhstances distributed or disf)ersed in lieu of a
controlled substance.
CONCLUSIO~

Rased upon the foregoinq, appellant respectfully
requests that this Court grant a rehearing in this matter.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of March, 1983.
DAVID L. WILJ<ItlSON
G eral

7/v
ROBERT N. PARRISH

Assistant Attorney r,eneral
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CETlTIFICATF. OF MAIL1N(:

I hereby certify that I mailen two true and exact
copies of the foregoing Rrief, postage prepaia, to Shelnen R.
Carter, Attorney for Respondent, 35n East Center Street,
Provo, Tltah, A46f'l, this Ath day of March, 19R3.
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